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MARGARET L. DICKEY*

Should the Law of the

Sea Conference Be Saved?
Three years after its opening session in Caracas, Venezuela in the summer of
1974, the sixth session of the 150-nation Law of the Sea Conference seesawed
to an inconclusive halt at United Nations headquarters in New York in July of
1977. Its results were two: a call to still another session in Geneva next spring
and an "Informal Composite Negotiating Text"-a revision of two previous
drafts of 303 Articles on ocean issues, ranging from passage through straits, to
pollution control, to new jurisdictional claims for purposes affecting more
than one-third of the world's oceans and most of its fisheries and oil and gas,
to the extraction of lumps of minerals (principally nickel and copper) from the
ocean floor.
In a hastily summoned press conference after the new text appeared, Ambassador Elliot Richardson, head of the United States delegation, took passing
note of some "true progress" but on the intensely ideological issues of the
mining of the deep ocean floor called the result so "fundamentally unacceptable" as to require him to recommend to the President a review of United
States interests in the continued negotiations.
It was a long way from the "new constitution for the oceans" described in
Caracas as the goal of the conference by the then Chairman of the United
States delegation, Ambassador John R. Stevenson. For other and different
reasons, former Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo, "father of the oceans,"
and others who ten years ago called for such a conference to create a new era
of cooperative development of the economic wealth of the oceans, had long
since decried the events at the Law of the Sea Conference as a territorial
"smash and grab" by coastal states rivaling, said Britain's Lord Ritchie
Calder, any colonial conquest in Africa and Asia.
*Margaret L. Dickey, a member of the Bar of New York and the District of Columbia, is a
member of the National Security Council Public Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea,
member of the United States Delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference 1974-76, and former
Adviser, Legal and International Organization Affairs, of the United States Mission to the United
Nations (1965-68).
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The failure of the current session of the conference to make any real
breakthrough on either of the two most fundamental issues on its agenda increases substantially the prospect that no comprehensive treaty is obtainable
which would satisfy the majority of participating nations and meet the essential requirements of the major ocean powers. Some conference critics contend
that a treaty along the lines of greatest agreement would be far worse than no
treaty at all; others fear that the legal void in the absence of a treaty would lead
to an uncontrollable territorial scramble in the oceans that cover two-thirds of
the Earth.
The question remains, can or should this lengthy and difficult effort to agree
on new fundamentals of ocean law be saved? Should it instead be quietly
shelved before further damage is done to the fabric of existing law, however
inadequate? What is the price of success . . . and the cost of failure, for the
United States, and for others? Is there an alternative to "success" or
"failure"?

In fact, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text which represented three
years of difficult negotiations during the least happy hours of the North-South
confrontation includes an impressive body of agreement on a large number of
issues from minor to some of fundamental importance. But from the beginning there was little progress on the points that would determine the basic
acceptability of this novel effort to anticipate and to forestall future conflict
over ocean uses: the undisputed exercise of common high seas rights of navigation over the broad reach of the oceans, and an agreement on how nations
shall undertake to mine the valuable mineral resources of the ocean bed
declared by the United Nations to be the "common heritage" of mankind.
At the end of the fifth session, whose diiatory pace was laid at the door of
the impending United States presidential election., Ambassador Christopher
Pinto of Sri Lanka, a leader of the third world forces said, accurately, that the
conference had proceeded to build what agreements it could, sidestepping the
fundamental decisions that could no longer be avoided. For the United States
such decisions involve a difficult to assess measure of the benefits of widely
known and agreed rules, particularly those affecting navigation rights as an
alternative to challenge and uncertainty. The question is whether these benefits
are worth the apparent cost of accommodation to a numerical majority of
states which are waging an ideological battle on the single issue of ocean mining in circumstances where events and the passage of time have removed the
meat and potatoes bargaining issue of the conference-jurisdiction over offshore coastal resources-from the table, leaving fewer serious players and considerably fewer cards to play with.
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For developing nations, many of whose immediate interests in offshore
resources and related rights are likely to be satisfied with or without a treaty,
the central issue has become that of "accepting" as Ambassador Pinto put it,
a right of access by developed states, about to engage in ocean mining in any
case, to at least half of the potential mining areas of the deep oceans. In return
for such an agreement, there would be established an international mining
"enterprise" for the other half, a venture which would in fact represent a real
departure in international economic arrangements, and perhaps a significant
benchmark for the future.
Considering that future mining sites potentially cover literally millions of
square miles (one field of nodules running from west of Mexico to southwest
of Hawaii covers 2 million square miles) and that the demand for greatly increased supplies of these particular minerals in the next two decades is not anticipated to be dramatic, it would not seem unrealistic to settle for a modest
beginning. What appeared, however, to be substantial progress toward
reasonable compromise at the last session was abandoned at the last minute by
the Chairman of Conference Committee One dealing with ocean mining, leaving the conference in most respects no further ahead than it was a year ago.
Whether or not a "comprehensive" treaty can be obtained or ought even to
be attempted further, the process of the negotiation alone has, for good or ill,
irrevocably altered the ancient rules of the sea in ways which will affect relations between nations for years to come.
Historian Arnold Toynbee long ago predicted that the end of the twentieth
century would be marked by a struggle for control of resources. The
magnitude of resources of the oceans both in terms of dollars and in terms of
the fundamentals of power in the modern world are reason enough for an attempt to avoid conflict over their use, and to improve upon longstanding
maritime rules of law ill adapted to the new age of resource exploitation.
Petroleum reserves in the submerged offshore continental margin, extending
several hundred miles seaward in some places, have been estimated in excess of
2 trillion barrels, recoverable at ever-increasing depths and supplying a
dramatically rising percentage of the world oil and gas requirements. World
fish catch has quadrupled in a single generation from 16 million tons in 1950 to
69 million tons in 1974 with resulting pressures on fish stocks. Merchant tonnage also quadrupled in the same period. Some 200 billion dollars worth of
cargos pass annually through United States ports alone. In the deep oceans,
beyond the continental margin, enormous resources of nickel, copper, cobalt,
and manganese are found in nodules scattered like charred potatoes on the
ocean floor. Commercial development of these resources is predicted variously
to result in anything from an economic bust in terms of cost competitiveness,
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
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to a cornucopia of all the world's future needs. There the nodules have lain for
eons of time. Modern technology has now made possible their recovery from
depths of 15,000 feet and more.
The process of deciding how and by whom all of these resources should be
used energizes all the fundamental forces on the late twentieth century political
stage-the control of resources and resource politics, the balance of nuclear
power, the division of rich nations and poor, the unifying imperatives of a
shrinking globe and the centripetal forces of a latter day nationalism unloosed
in an age to which it is dangerously ill-suited.
It well could be concluded that the Law of the Sea Conference was the
wrong subject, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, but since what it has
wrought is unlikely to go away, it is well to look at what it has done, how it got
there and how the current prospects might be improved.

Since the fifteenth century the prevailing rule of the seas has been freedom
of the seas-a ringing doctrine devised by Hugo Grotius on behalf of his native
Holland. Ironically, the competing legal view of the time-that the oceans
could be subjected to national domain-was articulated by John Selden, an
English jurist, on behalf of an insular England that was not too long later to
become the greatest global naval power and the enduring symbol of freedom
of the seas.
These two views describe the present conflict for similar if greatly
transformed reasons. Coastal states with few global strategic interests would
subject their offshore areas to maximum claims of national control, adding
not just resources but the power to control or challenge the activities of other
states in large areas of the ocean. Maritime powers, concerned with global
movement for both commercial and military reasons, deny the right of coastal
states to subject the great oceans to the shifting political whims of some 90 nations that border international waterways.
For centuries Grotius's law prevailed. It governed not only the right to
freely travel the world's oceans but to take their resources, mainly fish,
thought to be sufficient for all. Only in the last decades have the increasing
pressures upon fisheries and the emergence of new technology to develop other
ocean wealth, notably oil and gas, encouraged ever-expanding national claims
in the oceans.
In the 1960s both the Soviet Union and the United States were quietly
sounding the possibilities of new agreements to protect navigation rights from
the seaward march of coastal claims (one of the first of which was made by the
United States itself in 1945) when to their considerable dismay, the banner of
the common heritage of mankind was raised in the United Nations by Maltese
diplomat Arvid Pardo.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. 1
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The imminent prospects of wealth in the oceans were enormous, he said in a
four-hour speech to the General Assembly. Revenues from a tax on the
development of ocean resources could generate desperately needed funds for
industrial development in poor countries and offer a way out of the widening
gap between rich and poor. He called for a new conference to devise means of
preserving this "common heritage of mankind" for all nations. His appeal
was widely hailed as a visionary step forward to a new world order. To others,
less sanguine about the beneficent prospects of a "comprehensive" oceans
agreement, the promotion of ocean issues to a world stage only foreshadowed
the embroilment of longstanding ocean rights in the matrix of North-South
politics.
In 1970 the United Nations declared the wealth of the oceans "beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction"-left undefined-to be the "common heritage
of mankind." But by the time the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea assembled in Caracas after six years of preparatory work, little
remained of the common heritage. Rights to as much as 90 percent of the prospective resources in fish and oil and gas have been co-opted, not by the great
powers, but in one of the greater diplomatic ironies of a decade highly competitive in that regard, insisted upon by developing nations most of whom
stood to gain little and many to lose much. Why this happened does a great
deal to explain the politics and the difficulties of the Law of the Sea Conference.
The central issues of the conference, as they emerged in 1974, were not addressed to the vision of the "common heritage of mankind" but to the more
mundane task of juggling competing forces: to devising a balance of navigational rights and resource rights inherently at odds, to agreeing on the extent of
national control of other activities in the proposed exclusive economic zone,
and to devising a means of reconciling the remains of the "common heritage"
of the deep seabed with the practicalities of who had the money and
technology before ocean mining could begin at all.
Looking seaward from the land, the conference was fairly successful in dealing with traditional rights of navigation but the tentative agreements reached
were, as treaty texts, contingent upon acceptance of other parts of the
"package" of greater interest to developing countries. The conference agreed
on a limited extension of the territorial sea-the traditional "three-mile limit"
in which states exercise sovereign jurisdiction-to 12 miles, and with it to
establish a new arrangement for narrow international straits to recognize continuing rights of transit through and over them. For the United States the
straits provisions were the sine qua non of any treaty. Under the old three-mile
limit, high seas corridors existed in many narrow but vital waterways like
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. 1
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Gibraltar, which, with an extension to 12 miles would be overlapped by coastal
waters of the bordering states affecting both rights of submerged transit and of
overflight. Neither are accorded by the right of "innocent passage" customarily granted foreign states in the territorial sea.
While the secrecy value of submerged transit of submarines may have a
limited life in the future as new subsonic detection systems illuminate the
oceans, there is something to be said in any case for being out of sight, out of
mind. Rights of overflight remain vital, however, in circumstances where permission to overfly land may be denied for political reasons. A major Middle
East war was triggered by the closing of the straits of Tiran to Israel; and
subsequently a Unites States airlift of supplies required routes of flight that did
not entail permission necessary to overfly land territory of foreign states.
Beyond the territorial sea, the companion piece to acceptance by much of
the conference of the relatively narrow territorial sea, and the regime of straits,
was recognition of an additional 188-mile "exclusive economic zone" granting
to coastal states exclusive rights to both the living resources, fish, and the
nonliving resources, principally oil and gas. What was not agreed was the very
nature of this zone. Was it something entirely new-sui generis as the Latin
American lawyers called it-or did it represent only a modification of existing
law by granting specific additional resource rights to coastal states and preserving otherwise the traditional rights of the high seas open to all? The
distinction is not legalistic. It is fundamental. In a sense it involved, and continues to involve, a replay on the world stage of the same conflicting forces
which went into the making of United States oceans policy.
The United States had, on the one hand, a compelling strategic interest in
maintaining navigational freedoms, particularly for submarines, at a time
when the secret movement of submerged missile armed submarines were an
essential element of the nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, resource interests, strengthened by the emergence of OPEC and the spectre of resource
monopoly, were exercising their considerable political muscle to support an extension of national jurisdiction over the resources of the entire continental
margin in the Atlantic and off Alaska and Hawaii to ensure undisputed rights
to oil and gas reserves there. They were joined by domestic fisheries interests
lobbying for the extension of United States fishing jurisdiction from 12 to 200
miles, As a measure of its geographic magnitude, a 200-mile zone for the
United States would encompass an area the size of the land territory of the
continental United States.
Out of this crucible of conflicting motives was produced in 1970 a tentative
oceans policy, doomed perhaps from the beginning but one which in retrospect
appears a more pacific avenue for compromise from a global view than any
proposal since.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
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The initial United States proposal on coastal resources would have limited,
by a depth and distance formula, exclusive resource jurisdiction to an area in
most cases about 50 miles seaward, but with rights in a mixed zone beyond that
distance in which development of resources by coastal states would be subject
to revenue sharing with the international community. The motive for revenue
sharing was not the woolly-headed "give-away" predictably denounced by the
Wall Street Journal, but a perception of how best to induce limitations on
"creeping jurisdiction" in the oceans while at the same time protecting access
to the resources at minimal cost and minimal risk to worldwide rights of
navigation. The United States proposal was caught in a crossfire of domestic
criticism from resource interests, and greeted with suspicion by other nations
wary of carrots produced by nuclear politics. Its rapid disappearance was
unique in the annals of bureaucratic decisions.
The extension of resource jurisdiction to 200 miles was a foregone conclusion before the conference ever assembled. In their unseemly haste to acquire
for themselves whatever part of the "common heritage" was at hand, many
developing states apparently failed to figure out or to care who the principal
beneficiaries of such a zone would be, as they followed the pipers of the large
coastal states of North and South America which, except for the United States,
led the charge. The United States position at the conference was no less
parochial, but more confused by conflicting interests.
Around the world the proposed 200-mile economic zone would encompass
more than one-third of all the world's oceans, cross all of its major waterways,
include the areas of greatest interest to the infant science of ocean life (and of
greatest susceptibility to damage from marine pollution) and, most importantly, enfold perhaps more than 90 percent of the resources of oil and gas and
fish. In terms of money and in terms of national interest, the importance of
this coastal zone far exceeds the most optimistic prospects of a bonanza in
ocean mining. Of this none remains to the "common heritage," with the possible exception of some revenue sharing from future development of resources
on the far edges of the continental margin in those areas where it extends
beyond 200 miles. For some 60 nations with small coastlines or none at all, the
zone serves to exclude them from areas of the oceans to which they previously
had access and affecting most importantly their fishing rights; a right of
escalating magnitude as the world faces the prospect of famine where population pressures consume economic gains.
The principal beneficiaries of this territorial largesse were those who resisted
it longest: the United States and the Soviet Union. Add to these a handful of
others which include Canada, Japan, Norway, Australia, New Zealand
Mexico, Brazil, and India, and collectively they will acquire one-third of the
area and probably at least one-half of its resources. Add another dozen counInternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. 1
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tries of similarly privileged geography and the percentage figures rise over onehalf the area and considerably more of the known resources. Never have so
many given so much to so few.
Such a result does raise the question as to whether, written or unwritten, this
kind of thing is conducive to world stability. Inevitably the result will be to
widen the gap between North and South and to accelerate the gap between
what has become known as the third and fourth worlds-those raising
themselves from the poverty level, often by reason of possession of important
resources, and those remaining on the knife edge. In an era of diplomatic tunnel vision on the part of nations large and small, this result must surely win an
award for diplomatic myopia.
The satisfaction with which the inevitable result was greeted and anticipated
by United States resource interests, particularly by New England fisheries, was
tempered in official quarters by the difficulty in imposing limits on the grasp
of coastal state control in the oceans, which was the principal and compelling
reason for United States participation in a comprehensive ocean negotiation in
the first place. It was an effort made far more difficult by the United States
Congress, which preempted the conference and legislated a 200-mile fishing
zone for the United States, thus destroying the credibility of United States willingness to impose limits on its own claim of rights when its own interests-and
not very major ones at that-were involved.
Another consequence of the virtually instant agreement on the principle of
the 200-mile zone, reinforced by 200-mile fisheries legislation enacted in 1976,
has been to remove from the bargaining table the most readily apparent interests of the majority of the participants which are coastal states. It soon
became clear that so overwhelming was the support by coastal states for an
economic zone that it would become instant "customary law" even without a
treaty. This leaves the major maritime powers concerned with agreements
relating to freedom of navigation in relative isolation at one end of the spectrum, and at the other end, the "Group of 77" united in pursuit of an
ideological triumph for a new international economic order through the creation of an elaborate International Seabed Authority and an enterprise to
manage seabed mining.
There are, of course, other issues important to many participants: how to
deal with fisheries like tuna, for example, which are not by nature coastal; how
to conduct scientific research; how to establish pollution regulations; what
might be the nature and extent of new dispute settlement procedures.
However, most of these are enmeshed in the web of claims of coastal state
jurisdiction in the economic zone and are merely pawns in the central game of
the "high seas," or otherwise, status of the zone.
Between the small band of players interested in one key issue-the "high
seas" status of the economic zone-and the other interested in international
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
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management of' ocean mining, there is little to negotiate about. However
distasteful some of its provisions, the maritime powers might well settle for the
present text on navigational and coastal resource issues as being preferable to
the uncertainty that would prevail without a treaty. But those same powers
possess the technology to mine the seabed, and they find little reason to accept
the present restrictive provisions with respect to their right to engage in ocean
mining.
What is the fuss over seabed minerals all about? There is no doubt that the
known quantity of nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese contained in the
manganese nodules strewn on the surface of the ocean floor are more than sufficient to meet known or anticipated requirements for generations to come.
What is not so clear is if, or when, their taking will be cost-competitive with
present or potential land based producers of the same minerals.
One rationale for the development of ocean sites despite the enormous initial investments would be to create an alternative to an OPEC-type consortium of land producers controlling the market. But in the case of these
minerals, such a combination is highly unlikely. Copper is in oversupply,
anyway, and efforts of producers to coordinate in stabilizing world prices of
copper have failed. Most of the nickel imported by the United States comes
from Canada. With the exception of cobalt produced in Zaire, other minerals
are available from a number of alternative sources and cobalt can be produced
as a by-product of nickel. Developing countries, most severely affected by
rising prices of essential industrial materials, would have an interest, it would
be thought, in new sources of materials. The problem here is that their
negotiating forces are led by land-based mineral producing countries whose
chief concern is writing into a treaty a formula for controlling seabed production.
What has happened is that a highly speculative economic venture in its initial stages has become the central focus of a legal and political negotiation
singularly ill-equipped to deal with it. The obvious solution would be to
separate the "package" and proceed with what can be agreed upon with
respect to navigation and the economic zone. The rationale for the package approach, however, was that only in such a manner would a sufficiency of differing interests be satisfied to reach an acceptable agreement on all issues. The inducement to industrial states to negotiate at all on seabed mining has been that
of attaining wide acceptance of other provisions more important to industrial
states.
The United Nations declaration-which has no binding legal authority-that the resources of the area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
are the "common heritage of mankind" meant various things to various nations. To the United States, which considers that present law of the high seas
permits the taking of manganese nodules (just as fish may be caught), it
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
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meant the participation of all nations in the benefits of ocean mining through
some form of revenue generation, such as was initially proposed by a license
and fee system. To developing nations, the common heritage meant common
ownership of the resources and the incidents of ownership: the right to
establish an institution which would determine how and by whom and on what
terms the minerals would be developed.
In the Spring of 1976 a revised proposed text of the Law of the Sea Conference dealing with ocean mining that would have permitted reasonably
automatic access to half of seabed mine sites by seabed miners who met preestablished conditions as to site, duration and financial terms, was immediately denounced by the 114-member "group of 77" as a sell-out of the "common
heritage." What they wanted, they said, was not only an international body,
but an enterprise which would be its operating arm to mine the seabed directly
or in combination with other countries or companies, a view that had been incorporated in the first conference text in 1975, and rejected by developed
states.
A new avenue of compromise had then appeared: there could be a dual
system in which countries and companies would have direct access to half the
seabed mining sites subject to objective terms and conditions in the treaty
itself, and the enterprise would have the right to manage, as it chose, the mining of the other half. Quality of sites would be equalized by an arrangement
whereby an applicant would choose two mining sites without knowing which
site it would be granted, the other being "banked" for the enterprise.
A further step offered late in the 1976 resumed (Summer) session by former
United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was to guarantee on some international basis the financing of the initial venture of the enterprise so it
might begin operations on relatively equal terms with commercial ventures.
Mr. Kissinger's offer, had it come earlier and with more financial specifics attached, might have had far greater effect. This negotiation, in fact, may have
been one the former Secretary had in mind, when, in a recent speech, he sharply criticized the shortsightedness of American business interests in international negotiations. In 1975 and 1976 the influence of the mining companies on
the conservative and business oriented Treasury Department in the Nixon and
Ford Administrations successfully resisted any United States diplomatic moves
to resolve the seabeds impasse. By 1977, unrelenting lobbying efforts in Congress by the American mining interests had created such concern about mining
"rights" by an increasingly inward looking and resource-scared Congress, that
the regime for seabed mining took on an importance out of all proportion to
its real place in the longer view of ocean interests.
The relative scale of expected mining is illustrated by projections which anticipate that by the year 2000, not more than 10 to 20 mine sites will be operational out of an estimated number of first generation mine sites ranging from
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
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250 to 400. Of the minerals themselves the most valuable is nickel, of which the
reasonably consistent growth in the world market over the past two decades
has been in the vicinity of 6 percent. An ocean bonanza, if there is one, is at
least a generation down the road when any agreement reached today might
reasonably be expected to be modified by time and circumstance. In short, the
developing countries for ideological reasons, and the developed states for
reasons that might come under the same heading, created an overblown situation in which it was virtually impossible to deal with the mining issue on
economic rather than political terms.
Despite these inhibitions, however, a small negotiating group representing
all the principal factions met before and during the last session of the conference under the chairmanship of Norwegian Minister of State, Jens Evensen,
to work out a compromise text on the basic arrangements of a dual system of
access, financing an international enterprise, establishing the scale of production controls keyed to the nickel market for the protection of land-based
miners, and a system of voting in the executive body, the Council of the International Seabed Authority, which would reasonably reflect the real distribution of interests. It was this text which at the last hour the Committee Chairman Paul Engo of the Cameroon, failed to include and instead substituted an
apparently similar, but substantially different text worked out in secret with a
few representatives of third-world countries with a result that was, as Ambassador Richardson described it, "fundamentally unacceptable."
Insofar as seabed mining was concerned, by mid-1977 the Conference was at
ground zero or worse. Among the many unacceptable features of the new text,
it appeared to require transfer of mining technology to the International
Authority as a condition of application to mine. Another provision would prejudge the outcome of the proposed 20-year review of the system if no new
agreement were reached within a five-year period, thus opening the way to attain the single ocean management system desired by the Group of 77 by the
mere process of non-negotiation if the negotiations were not satisfactory.
Together with other conditions, including a substantially increased production
limit on seabed mining, it is difficult to assume that Chairman Engo intended
any serious effort at compromise.
Several explanations of this unexpected diversion of the work of the
negotiating group are possible, but none has much validity. One hindrance to
compromise has been a continuing misjudgment by a number of developing
countries of the degree to which the United States could or would move on
seabed issues to protect rights of navigation. To many, the United States has
appeared so anxious to obtain a treaty that would protect these rights that it
would ultimately, as the Wall Street Journal would say, "give away" the seabed. This widespread impression was fostered, unfortunately, by the high
visibility of military advisers attending some of the United States negotiations
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
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in the early stages of the conference and by American exhortations to haste
which made time itself appear to be a bargaining card. In fact, time, on seabed
issues, now works the other way.
Whether or not a tradeoff might ever have been considered-and the argument can be made that the developed countries, with possession of the
technology and the financing, would be able to negotiate acceptable arrangements on the basis of economic benefits-and whether or not a more
statesmanlike approach by the United States to the ideological trappings of the
seabed issue would have produced a better result in the rest of the draft treaty
text, is by now academic. Even were such a value to be placed upon other parts
of the text, acceptance of the present mining proposals of the Group of 77 is
not now politically acceptable in the Senate. If the Carter Administration is
seeking to improve relations with the third world, the Congress is clearly in less
global a frame of mind.
Both Houses of Congress expect in due course to pass legislation that will
give the United States mining companies official cachet and other security they
say they need to commence commercial mining operations. Furthermore, the
gains in the text on navigational issues involving "high seas" status of the exclusive economic zone have not been sufficient to move sentiment heavily in
favor of further concessions on seabed mining. Another speculative scenario
has been that the United States would make further concessions if the situation
deteriorated to the point where a continuing stalemate would cause a conference breakdown to be charged to United States intransigence. Such a situation is not now likely to materialize. There are too many forces at the conference that would converge to avoid any dramatic breakup of the conference
with its far reaching consequence for the United Nations itself and for the badly needed effort to come to grips with more immediate third-world problems.
Far more likely would be an effort to play out a less conspicuous and less
definitive winding down of the conference. And while the Soviet Union, with
great land resources and little real interest in the seabed other than to make
sure the United States does not secure a commanding position, has an obvious
temptation to curry third-world favor without much short-term risk, neither of
the great powers is likely to play games that could impair their common
navigational concerns.
Still another, more Byzantine scenario, would have the Arab states buying
mining technology on the world market and financing an "enterprise" in
business, for the purpose of gaining control over international seabed
resources development machinery. However, such a uniquely capitalistic venture would have the practical result of opening access for all comers since such
an "enterprise" would scarcely be distinguishable, whatever its name, from
any presently proposed commercial mining consortia.
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
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The fact is that in the beginning time was on the side of the developing countries and of coastal states, both in extending the grasp of coastal states over activities within the economic zone, and of negotiating compromises on the seabed. The proposed dual access system and a mining "enterprise" is a long way
from the license and fee system originally contemplated to acknowledge the
"common heritage." But the value of time has run its course. To the extent
that expectable gains in a treaty for major maritime states are minimized by
time and events, the value of a treaty and the price to be paid diminish.

What now are the gains and losses in a treaty, and for whom? Does the text
achieve, in any substantial measure, its intended purpose of avoiding future
conflict or does it merely institutionalize the seeds of conflict? Would the less
certain but more pragmatic process of building a new body of law on a caseby-case basis decrease or increase the hazards of ocean conflicts?
These are simple questions to ask but difficult ones to answer. For the
United States and for all maritime states there are definite gains on the navigational issues of original concern-the territorial sea of 12 miles coupled with
provisions that preserve satisfactory rights of transit and overflight of straits.
Critics of a treaty point out that the realities of power are such that these rights
in any event would be maintained and this is undoubtedly so, but at some cost.
Even with a treaty it is conceiVable that some straits states may not ratify it absent other benefits; and even if they do, it is not unprecedented, as in the case
of bases and other concomitants of modern peacekeeping, that the United
States will find it necessary to dispense some additional incentives to smooth
its path. Nevertheless, a clearly established statement of rights is obviously
preferable to a process of test and response in an area of ocean rights involving
such highly charged matters as the deployment of submarines, or navigation in
crowded seas like the Mediterranean which for thousands of years has been a
bloody avenue of the ebb and flow of power.
The next question is whether these same treaty articles retain their value
when linked, as they must inevitably be linked in a treaty, to the kind of
economic zone now described in the text. In this equation the answer is less
clear. The problem is described in terms of negotiating the "legal status" of
the zone. Does the coastal state exercise the kind of extensive control which,
with the exception of specified navigational rights, could lead to a territorial
sea? Or, instead, does the area remain high seas-open to all-for nonresource purposes?
For many nations "high seas" are political trigger words. They carry with
them the freight of empires past, and great powers present. Neither is popular.
This makes it more difficult to create the kind of flexible balance of rights and
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duties which, while desirable from a strategic view, should also be desirable
from the point of view of all nations which participate now or expect to participate in the future in ocean commerce. Some 60 nations, for example, will
be "zone locked"-unable to reach the seas beyond a zone without transiting
the zones of one or more foreign states. The opportunities for disputes are obvious.
The new text incorporates a partial compromise on the high seas question,
but like many such compromises it is one which largely reserves the options of
both sides by preserving the possibility of both interpretations. The economic
zone is no longer described as sui generis or unique, but neither is it described
as high seas. Canada, in urging the inclusion of the compromise text at the end
of the last session, noted that it preserved the "special status" of the zone,
while the United States urged the same, noting the protection of high seas
rights. In other words, and given other articles which grant to coastal states extensive rights with respect to non-resource activities and with limited avenues
of appeal to dispute settlement procedures, it is a very close question as to
whether the danger of "creep" is any more or less with or without a treaty.
The best that can be said for the compromise text-and it is a worthwhile
gain-is that if the conference itself fails, the legislative history of the conference can not be utilized in the future to show that there was widespread
agreement that the economic zone was not high seas. This is, however, of
greater comfort to lawyers than it can be expected to be a restraint upon nations and politicians.
While creeping jurisdiction leading toward a 200-mile territorial sea is
theoretically more possible in a state of uncertainty than within the context of
a treaty, it is not equally clear that in the real world such a 200-mile territorial
sea would occur. Despite the extensions of jurisdiction in the 1960s, the fact is
that only a few states sought to claim territorial seas of 200 miles, and these
were states of minor consequence in influencing the rules by which nations
live. In the future, because of the unfavorable position of the landlocked and
coastally disadvantaged states with respect to existing and future fisheries
rights on the once open seas, regional groups will be under pressure to develop
cooperative arrangements. Other nations may, at last, have second thoughts.
That the "exclusive economic zone" has gone as far as it has, has been a
triumph for Latin American diplomats and those of other coastal states with
large coastlines in holding together a wholly illogical alliance with states of
Africa and Asia whose rights will be more boxed in than extended by the
Balkanization of the oceans.
The argument can be made that the nature of the economic zone has gone
too far in the direction of national jurisdiction to serve the long term interests
of most states; that the text is not substantially remediable; and that the
ultimate limits of the economic zone might better be left to some reflection and
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to the more pragmatic approach of time and circumstance. To this it is replied
that the only future restraint on the grasp of coastal states will be by treaty-or
by force.
To this point, if for no better reason than the concept that "the devil you
know is better than the devil you don't," the treaty text, with the exception of
its seabed mining provision, can probably be judged a minimal net gain for the
United States and other maritime powers. For non-coastal states, whatever
rights may ultimately be embodied in the text with respect to access to
fisheries, if of little consolation, is at least a basis on which to negotiate and so
also a net, if minimal, gain. For both maritime and coastal states rights to
economic resources are protected by the inevitable 200-mile resource zone with
or without a treaty. For those states whose continental margins extend beyond
200 miles, the revenue sharing contemplated by a treaty in that still-in-thefuture area of resource development would appear to be a minimal price for
uncontested access. At the same time, the liabilities of the present treaty text
are likely to occur in any case, requiring an on-going process of more localized
negotiations.
From a longer view of world order it is not at all certain that the creation of
new domains over the richest area of the oceans will contribute to the objective
of conflict avoidance. Since, however, that possibility seems inevitable in any
case, such speculations do not alter the equation.
At this balance point the weighting factor becomes the outcome of the deep
mining issue. In making this judgment gains and losses are difficult to measure
for they are most likely to be felt in areas unrelated to oceans, shadowing the
future course of North-South relations, and even of the United Nations itself.
So little is known of the economics of seabed mining and so little is known
of how accurate the present projections of future supply and demand are that
an extra-terrestrial observer would have to conclude that the effort of Earthling diplomats to negotiate rigid economic arrangements for a venture of such
unknown quantity were mystifying indeed.
It is conceivable that had the acrimonious ideological argument not so
politicized the issue and/or had the United States Treasury Department in the
previous administration not held such a narrow but powerful view of longrange United States interests, some system of joint ventures between industrial
states or their companies and some instrumentality representing the "common
heritage" might have been devised as mining developed under normal market
forces. Such ventures have been negotiated for decades by the international oil
companies without noticeable impairment of their capacity to expand their
business. The basic requirement of such a process for ocean mining was not,
however, forthcoming. The requirement was agreement on objective criteria
for access to the area and a decision making process that precluded decisions
made by numerical majorities. What was feared was that an international
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body could itself become an OPEC, dictating arbitrary terms of ocean mining,
which is, in fact, a not too harsh description of the apparent intent of the new
Composite Text.
At the present moment it appears likely that seabed mining will proceed with
legislative endorsement in the United States, which will probably be followed
by reciprocal legislation by other countries with mining technology, many of
whom are already associated in consortiums with United States companies.
At the time that legislation is enacted, (and unless miraculously the chief
pillars of the treaty text can be agreed at the scheduled 1978 Spring session)
whatever adverse effects such legislation unloose upon United States foreign
policy objectives generally will come about in any event. Thus the principal remaining inducement for the United States to remain an active planner in seeking a further compromise will fade. Legislative action by the United States
which must implicitly or explicitly view resources of the seabed, like fish,
available to all under existing international law, flies in the face of the interpretations given to the UN declaration by the developing countries. Such
legislative action threatens what remains of the "common heritage" and clearly will have some immediate and long-term adverse effects on North-South
relations generally, all for a purpose of debatable legal, political and economic
validity. Whether the prospect of such legislation will drive the conferees to
early compromise, as some of its congressional proponents believe, remains to
be seen. But for developing countries, whatever retaliation they may seek to invoke, failure of the treaty process would risk the loss of an international venture which could prove a genuine and innovative step forward and one which
would have two decades to demonstrate its workability. By the year 2000 the
climate for cooperative existence in the world may have improved.
One further, and possibly in the long run the most important, effect of
failure might well be to set the United Nations along the way toward the fate of
the League of Nations, if it proves an ineffective instrument for dealing with
global problems of real and global consequences for generations to come.
What then can be done to retrieve the treaty text and make possible the kind
of broad agreement which, if it falls far short of a constitution for the oceans,
will at least establish an international framework for future ocean arrangements?
Substantively it is possible to attain essential improvements in the text if a
majority of nations are persuaded of the benefits of a treaty. It is not,
however, clear that a great many nations, having attained recognition of
rights, are willing to abide by their concomitant duties. Procedurally, it is
likely that any further improvement can be agreed upon only by escalating the
basic decisions from the level of conference negotiations to that of foreign
ministers. This would involve shifting the negotiating process to a forum
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which minimizes the political influence of nations with no stakes in the outcome or with a preference for no agreement.
On the two outstanding substantive issues the shape of a workable agreement is apparent. With respect to the preservation of high seas rights in the
economic zone the compromise incorporated in the new text represents some
progress but not enough. It is likely that "high seas" itself is so loaded a
phrase that the issue probably cannot be dealt with head on. But if it is
necessary to accept an outcome which does not explicitly recognize the
economic zone as being high seas for purposes other than rights accorded in
the treaty, the substantive effects of the compromise can and should go further
toward a genuine balance of interests. As one example, the insistence of the
developing coastal states on control of scientific research in their areas is more
directed at military activities of the major powers than it is at marine science.
Said one African diplomat, "We want the right to call your activities illegal
if we catch you." The result is more likely to impose great burdens on badly
needed research in the oceans than it is likely to have any effect on military activities. In the present text as well there is little restraint upon the arbitrary exercise by coastal states of powers granted with respect to fisheries. In both
cases avenues of appeal to compulsory dispute settlement procedures would
more accurately reflect what was intended to be a balance of rights of coastal
states with corresponding duties to other states.
On ocean mining the burden of compromise is now, however unfairly, largely upon the developing countries. If the cost of "recognizing the rights of a few
states to half the seabeds" as Ambassador Pinto put it, seems high, even
higher in the long run would be the loss of the opportunity to establish, with
broad support from all participants, an effective beginning for an international mining enterprise. Still higher would be the future cost of failure of this
first global effort to reach binding agreement on issues of common concern.
A genuine dual system for ocean mining for its first 20 years would not prejudge the future for all time to come. It would provide needed years in which
to see more clearly the future impact of seabed mining, its economic requirements, and what its environmental impact on ocean life may be. If acceptance of some limitations on future production from seabeds sources to present and future land based producers is inevitable, then these limitations
should not inhibit the undertaking itself or its future potential.
Perhaps the key element of the compromise, assuming the general acceptability of a dual system, is a system of voting in the Council that will inspire
the confidence of all nations in the fairness of the system. Anything less is
doomed to failure either by failure to ratify an agreement or the separate
development of alternative sources of resources with no benefit to the common
heritage.
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If the next session fails to produce acceptable compromise on the two key
issues then the conference will face failure. If the chances are not promising
that compromises will materialize by then, are there any alternative routes to
avoid either breakdown or stalemate? One alternative in the past would have
seemed so antithetical to the asserted requirements of all participants as to be
dismissed out of hand. That is to create under the aegis of the Conference
President, veteran UN diplomat Ambassador Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe
of Sri Lanka, one or two small negotiating groups, similar to the two that were
formed during the past session of the conference, and representing all major
factions in the negotiation. Their task would be to produce a recommended
compromise text as a whole in a series of meetings that could require a year or
more while the conference itself recessed. The objections are several and from
all sides.
From the outset the United States has urged haste upon the conference lest
the passage of time legitimize coastal claims and make more difficult their
restraint in a treaty. This in fact has already occurred. Developing countries
have feared that only an on-going conference seemingly without end could,
like the Chinese water torture, induce a compromise on ocean mining more to
their liking as the price of a treaty. Still other nations object to being nonparticipants in the process. Finally, the committee chairmen, who in this session successfully resisted any exercise of powers by the President to make his
own changes in the text, would obviously object to the termination of their
authority.
None of these objections should prevail. The passage of time has already
made a 200-mile economic zone inevitable. A delay in the conference process
could serve a real purpose in testing the waters of actual claims and adjustments without diminishing the prospect of obtaining a treaty acceptable to
the diverse negotiating states much more than it has already been diminished.
Insofar as mining is concerned, if the United States legislation passes, ventures
will be commenced regardless of the UN resolution and a differing view of the
legal ownership of the minerals. Since, however, the lead time on commercial
operations-time to build processing facilities and other necessities-is figured
at three years, a treaty is not necessarily pre-empted. Much of the proposed
legislation contemplates an eventual treaty.
Insofar as the "small group" negotiating process itself is concerned it has
proven productive in the last session when one group produced at least a
somewhat improved text on the status of the economic zone and the other,
dealing with seabed mining, did make progress even though its results were not
included in the new text. The fact is that the deal must be struck between those
with real interests at stake and not among those who divert the conference for
political ends.
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Lastly, the committee process has in most cases served its purpose well.
With the exception of mining, the basic texts, subject to the nuances and adjustments required by decisions about the economic zone, have been completed. In the case of mining no procedural devices yet tried have produced any
effective result. If other aspects of the conference have proceeded successfully
by sidestepping the fundamental choices, it is clear that the details of a mining
regime could be quickly worked out if, but only if, the decision to compromise
is made first on a genuine parallel system, including its decision-making processes, which can command ratification by the principal participants. Such a
negotiating arrangement would also have the additional benefit of preserving
from erosion by the conference at large the presently substantially completed
sections of the text.
The basic requirement of any comprehensive oceans treaty is that it provides
benefits for each of the major interests involved sufficient to make other less
appealing provisions acceptable within its overall framework. Much time and
money has been spent on an effort unique in history. It is arguable that an effort of such difficulty and complexity should not be hastened, but as each
month passes the inexorable march of events tends to remove, one by one, the
essence of the negotiations. If the conference does not produce what amounts
to an acceptable draft treaty text at the next session, it is not likely to do so at
all. And then, as Santayana said, those who will not learn from history may
well be doomed to repeat it.
If none, in the long view, will be the winners should the bloody history of
land borders be replayed in the world's oceans, the losers are certain to be
those whose voice is heard least outside an international forum such as this
one. But the cost to all, great and small, can only be gauged by the awesome
measure of a struggle for two-thirds of the planet Earth in the twenty-first century. A treaty, if there is to be one, must be more than a mirror image of that
uneasy prospect.
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